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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas,' the United States Supreme Court extended
constitutional protections to gays in the United States. In writing the majority
opinion for the Court,2 not only did Justice Kennedy passionately extol the virtues
of constitutional privacy as a protection for personal autonomy,3 but he also utilized
foreign law to support his argument that American constitutional law needed to
modernize. In his dissent,5 Justice Scalia reacted negatively to Justice Kennedy's
invocation of foreign law as a policy basis for fashioning American constitutional
law.6 Justices Kennedy and Scalia implicitly sparred over the role that foreign law
should play in American constitutionalism. One Justice viewed foreign law as a
valid guidepost for American constitutional jurisprudence, while the other Justice
conceived of foreign law as beyond not only American borders but also beyond the
pale.
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., Harverford College; J.D., Boston
College.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. Id. at 562-85.
3. Id. at 576-79.
4. Id. at 573, 576-77.
5. Id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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This article examines what role foreign law should play in the narrow confines
of the constitutional protection of sexual freedom, specifically for gay Americans
but also with implications for heterosexual Americans. First, the article reviews the
background and doctrine of Lawrence! Then, the article reviews how Bowers v.
Hardwick8 created high and rough obstacles for Justice Kennedy as he sought to be
sexually inclusive.9 Next, the article examines how Justice Kennedy utilized
foreign law as a device for overcoming the obstacles created by Bowers and how
Justice Scalia reacted negatively to Justice Kennedy's use of foreign legal
sources.' ° Finally, this article examines the merits of both views by reviewing two
civil procedure cases where foreign law played a role in the genesis of civil
procedure doctrine."
II. LAWRENCE: BACKGROUND AND DOCTRINE
Both Lawrence and Bowers began in the same fashion. In Lawrence, John Geddes
Lawrence and Tyrone Garner were engaged in sodomy in Lawrence's apartment. 2 In
Bowers, a Mr. Hardwick was engaged in sodomy with another adult male in the
bedroom of Mr. Hardwick's home. 3 In Lawrence, the police entered the residence in
response to a reported weapons disturbance.' 4 In Bowers, the police somehow gained
access to Mr. Hardwick's bedroom in order to discover the commission of the act of
sodomy.'5 After police involvement, both cases differed procedurally. In Lawrence, the
State of Texas pursued a prosecution in Texas Courts' 6 for violation of a Texas statute
that prohibited homosexual intercourse.17 In Bowers, though the men ran afoul of a
Georgia statute that prohibited sodomy,'" the State of Georgia failed to prosecute a
criminal case.' 9
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyrone Garner stood convicted before a Texas Justice
of the Peace. They requested and received a trial de novo in Texas county criminal
court, unsuccessfully challenging the Texas homosexual anti-sodomy statute"' asviolating the Equal Protection and Due Process Protection Clauses of the United States
7. See infra Part II.
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
14. 539 U.S. at 562-63.
15. 478 U.S. at 187-88.
16. 539 U.S. at 563.
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (2003).
19. 478 U.S. at 188.
20. Lawerence, 539 U.S. at 563.
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Constitution" and the Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution." After
pleading nolo contendere, each was fined.23 They appealed unsuccessfully to the Texas
District Court of Appeals.24 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
25Lawrence to consider whether Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Geddes' Due Process privacy
rights had been violated and whether Bowers should be overruled.26
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Lawrence Court,27 overruled Bowers.8 Justice
Kennedy utilized substantive due process privacy doctrine under the Fourteenth
Amendment to overrule Bowers and fashioned constitutional doctrine protective of gay
sexual liberty.29 Justice Kennedy opened his majority opinion with a discussion about
privacy. He noted that in American constitutional tradition the government fails to be
omnipresent in the home and outside the home. Privacy extended beyond spatial
boundaries. He viewed Lawrence as involving "liberty of the person both in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions."
30
Justice Kennedy based his doctrinal analysis of gay sexual privacy and liberty on a
line of cases involving birth control.31 Though he mentioned Pierce v. Society of
Sisters32 and Meyer v. Nebraska33 as creating a broad basis for substantive due process
privacy protection,34 Justice Kennedy relied directly on Griswold v. Connecticut,
3
Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 Roe v. Wade,37 Carey v. Population Services International,38 and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.39 Justice Kennedy traced
the progressive broadening of privacy rights implicating personal family decisions
from married couples to unmarried individuals. 4° For him, Bowers stood out as an
anomaly in the privacy line of cases. He identified how the Bowers Court failed to
recognize Bowers as part of a logical progression of expanding privacy rights
• • 41
protecting personal relationships.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. TEXAS CONST. art. 1, § 3a.
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
24. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
25. 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
27. Id. at 562.
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id. at 562.
31. Id. at 564-66.
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
34. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
38. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
39. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
40. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-67.
41. Id. at 564-66.
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According to Justice Kennedy, the Bowers Court went wrong when the Court
failed to identify the constitutional issue properly. Kennedy wrote, "[t]o say that the
issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward.... " The Bowers Court failed to understand how
anti-sodomy statutes stigmatized homosexuals.43 Kennedy conceived of anti-sodomy
statutes as doing far more than regulating sexual conduct when he wrote, "[t]he statutes
do seek to control a personal relationship that... is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals."" For Kennedy, privacy involved the
constitutional protection, not of sexual acts, but of personal decisions involving family
relationships. Gays possessed the same autonomy to enter into such relationships as
heterosexuals.4'5 Anti-sodomy laws, especially homosexual anti-sodomy laws, impaired
the right to freely enter a homosexual relationship. To protect the right to choose a
homosexual relationship, Justice Kennedy held that consenting adults not engaging in a
public act such as prostitution possess the substantive due process right to engage in
sexual practices, including sodomy, common to a homosexual lifestyle without
government interference."
M. THE MOUNTAIN FACING JUSTICE KENNEDY
In overruling Bowers and holding that gays possessed the constitutional right to
enter adult, consensual sexual relations without government interference, Justice
Kennedy had to overcome some tall doctrinal obstacles created by the Bowers Court.
First, the Bowers Court showed a strong sensitivity to the role of the United States
Supreme Court in developing constitutional principles. The Bowers majority noted that
the case "calls for some judgment about the limits of the Court's role in carrying out its
constitutional mandate. ' 7 Justice White, writing for the majority in Bowers," woried
that the Supreme Court easily could overstep its bounds when developing substantive
due process privacy because substantive due process privacy cases lack textual support
from the Constitution. Justice White warned, "[s]triving to assure itself and the public
that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and
Federal Government. .. ."9 Justice White opened the majority opinion by noting that
this case failed to require a judgment on whether sodomy laws were wise or desirable."
42. Id. 567.
43. Id. at 574-75.
44. Id. at 567.
45. Id. at 573-74.
46. Id. at 578.
47. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
48. Id. at 187.
49. Id. at 191.
50. Id. at 190.
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Justice White feared that the Supreme Court risked its legitimacy when the
Court could be viewed as determining whether democratically created law was
wise or desirable. White wanted to avoid placing the Supreme Court in a conflict
with the democratic branches of American government." He wanted to avoid a
repeat of the conflict created in the 1930's by the United States Supreme Court in
utilizing substantive due process to strike down New Deal legislation. 2 Justice
White believed that the Supreme Court's conflict with President Franklin
Roosevelt resulted in a repudiation of much of the substantive due process
doctrine. 3 White sought to remain faithful to the words of the Constitution in order
to prevent the Judiciary from assuming authority to govern the United States
without express constitutional permission. 4
To prevent substantive due process from becoming a vague and elastic basis
for the Supreme Court to create constitutional law, Justice White demanded in
Bowers that substantive due process have an explicit and understandable doctrinal
basis. Relying on past Supreme Court cases, Justice White found that substantive
due process rights included those fundamental liberties implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. White defined fundamental liberties as those liberties that became
deeply rooted in American history and tradition.56 He conceived of the fundamental
right being asserted in Bowers as the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy,57
and Justice White found that such a right possessed no deep roots not only in
American history and tradition but in Western history and tradition as well. 8
Regarding American history, Justice White carefully catalogued the long history of
state laws criminalizing sodomy,59 reviewing four different periods in American
history. First, all thirteen original states had criminal sodomy laws.60 Second, in
1868, at the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, thirty-two states had
criminal sodomy statutes in effect.
61 Third, until 1960, all states outlawed sodomy.
62
63
Finally, by 1986, twenty-four states provided criminal sanctions for sodomy.
A due process privacy right of homosexual sexual liberty could never exist
according to Justice White because such a liberty failed to be rooted in American
51. Id. at 194-95.
52. See generally LEONARD BAKER: BACK TO BACK, THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1967); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE
GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002).
53. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
54. Id. at 195.
55. Id. at 191.
56. Id. at 192.
57. Id. at 190.
58. Id. at 192-94.
59. Id. at 192-93
60. Id. at 192, n.5.
61. Id. at 192-93, n.6.
62. Id. at 193.
63. Id. at 193-94.
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history as evidenced by the longstanding and widespread criminal prohibition
against sodomy in the United States. However, Justice White did not stop his
analysis of American sexual legal tradition with American law. Justice White
joined with Chief Justice Burger in connecting American sexual legal tradition
with broader Western Civilization sexual tradition. White observed that
proscriptions against homosexual consensual sodomy possessed "ancient roots.
' 6
Though Justice White failed to describe what he meant by that statement, he did
provide a citation to a law review article about the constitutional right to privacy
65for homosexual activity.
The article on which Justice White relied provided a short history of arguments
favoring the outlawing of homosexual sodomy. This short history covered the breadth
of Western Civilization from Plato to the Old Testament to Mosaic Law through the
Middle Ages to Blackstone.66 The survey connected the history of anti-sodomy
prohibition to American law by way of Blackstone, noting that "Blackstone's
characterization of sodomy, 'as a crime against nature,' would serve as the basis for
most American sodomy laws. ' 67 Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion,6
connected with Justice White's implicit history of anti-sodomy prohibitions in Western
Civilization. Chief Justice Burger wrote, "[a]s the Court notes... the proscriptions
against sodomy have very 'ancient roots.' '69 While Justice White remained implicit in
his historical argument relying on a citation to a law review article, Chief Justice
Burger was explicit. He wrote, "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching."7 For Chief Justice Burger, condemnation of homosexual sexual practices
remained firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.71
Justice Kennedy in Lawrence faced major obstacles that were created by
Justice White and Chief Justice Burger in Bowers. In light of Bowers, Justice
Kennedy could be accused of making up law in order to bring about a socio-legal
result, legitimizing legal behavior where the United States Constitution fails to
explicitly protect that behavior. To overrule Bowers, Justice Kennedy would have
to defy not only American history but millennia of Western tradition implicitly
referenced by Justice White and explicitly outlined by Chief Justice Burger. Justice
Kennedy had to seek a way around these obstacles.
64. Id. at 192.
65. Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986).
66. Id. at 525-26.
67. Id. at 526.
68. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
69. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
71. Id. at 196 (Burger, C., concurring).
690
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IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S FOREIGN LAW STRATEGY AND JUSTICE
SCALIA'S CRITIQUE
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy faced the Bowers Court's view of history in
which homosexual sodomy remained condemned from ancient times and
throughout American history. Justice Kennedy needed to counter the Bowers
rationale that constitutional protection of homosexual sexuality would be a
revolutionary step that defied Western and American moral tradition. Kennedy did
indeed develop some strategies to counter the moral and historical imperatives of
the Bowers majority and Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion.
A. A Foreign Law Strategy
Justice Kennedy refused to directly debate the historical views of anti-
sodomy prohibitions advanced by the Bowers Court.72 However, Justice Kennedy
floated in Lawrence some historical considerations about anti-homosexual legal
prohibitions.73 Overall, he argued that anti-homosexual prohibitions emerged only
belatedly in American history, noting "the concept of the homosexual as a
distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century. '7' He found
that no American state singled out homosexual sexual relations for criminal
prosecution until the 1970's. 75 At best, Justice Kennedy blurred the historical
bases of Bowers, writing "the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more
complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Burger indicate., 76 In addition to blurring the historical story told by the Bowers
Court, Justice Kennedy performed the fundamental analytical skill, familiar to
lawyers, of identifying an analysis or argument in a different dimension.77 He
refocused the historical analysis from early American history to the status of the
law during the second half of the Twentieth Century. By focusing on the last fifty
years, Justice Kennedy identified "an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.""
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003).
73. Id. at 567-72.
74. Id. at 568.
75. Id. at 570.
76. Id. at 571.
77. See Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, Report on the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS B. 153 (discussing elaborating legal theory as a mode of legal analysis and reasoning).
78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
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Justice Kennedy's efforts to counter the strong anti-gay historical story of
Bowers by blurring historical visions and refraining the debate toward more recent
history could take Justice Kennedy only so far in overcoming the historical
imperatives of Bowers. He still had to counter the argument that American
constitutional protection of homosexual rights would constitute a deep aberration
from Western history and jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy still needed to assure law
abiding Americans that he was not involved in "the imposition of the Justices' own
choice of values on the States and the Federal Government." 9 Kennedy sought a
way to counter the view that he had signed onto a homosexual political agenda that
placed the Supreme Court outside the American mainstream and, by implication,
placed America outside the Western jurisprudential and moral mainstream. 0
To counter Justice White and Chief Justice Burger's references to the fact that
American homosexual sexual legal prohibitions grew out of proscriptions against
sodomy that possessed ancient roots in Western Civilization, Justice Kennedy in
Lawrence relied on foreign law to demonstrate that the United States would not
position itself outside international legal and moral norms by constitutionally protecting
the right of gays to engage in sexual relations.8 ' In fact, Justice Kennedy went further
by noting that, "[t]o the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been
rejected elsewhere."82 Justice Kennedy supported his assertion that American anti-gay
law served as the aberration to Western jurisprudence and not vice-versa by referring to
British law, 3 decisions of the European Court of Human Rights involving the United
Kingdom 84 and other countries. 5 In addition, he turned to laws of other nations by
relying on an amicus brief filed for international and American human rights
advocates.
6
In his struggle to overcome the Bowers Court's implicit assertion that homosexual
anti-sodomy criminalization found support as a historical imperative, Justice Kennedy
in Lawrence tapped into a treasure trove by using the amicus brief filed by Mary
Robinson and other international human rights advocates. In a direct sense, the amicus
brief supported Justice Kennedy's assertion that "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing this alleged homosexual agenda).
81. Id. at 573, 576-77.
82. Id. at 576.
83. Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c.60, § 1 (Eng.); HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION
COMMrITEE, REPORT, 1957, Cmnd. 247.
84. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 00044787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
85. Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988).
86. Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch,
Interights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights in Support
of Petitioners, Lawrence (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
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intimate, consensual conduct."87 The amicus brief urged the United States Supreme
Court to "pay decent respect to these opinions of humankind."8 The opinions of
mankind forbade the punishment of people for choosing to love another 9 and barred
the criminalization of sodomy between consenting adults.9°
The amicus brief went on to describe cases from a variety of national courts
and international tribunals, national legislation, and treaty law that protected gays
in their choice of private, consensual sexual behavior. The brief pointed for support
to case law from the European Court of Human Rights," United Nations Human
Rights Committee,92 Constitutional Court of South Africa,9' Constitutional Court of
Colombia,94 British House of Lords,95 Canadian Supreme Court,96 Supreme Court
of Israel,97 and the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. 98 In addition, the brief referred
to national statutory law in Canada, Australia, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa,
Costa Rica, and Namibia,99 and constitutions in South Africa, Fiji, Ecuador, and
Switzerland.' °° The brief relied not only on the European Convention on Human
Rights, '°1 but also on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child,1'2 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 3
In addition to providing Justice Kennedy in Lawrence with broad transnational and
international case, statutory, and treaty law that protected gays, the amicus brief also
analyzed privacy rights through three discrete analytical methodologies in international
and transnational contexts. The amicus brief utilized decisional,'O relational,105 and
zonal 106 privacy analyses. Decisional privacy protects intimate personal choices,0 7
87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
88. Amicus Brief, supra note 86, at 2.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 10 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)).
92. Id. at 11 (citing U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992
(1994) (Toonen v. Australia)).
93. Id. at 12-13 (citing Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR
1517 (CC)).
94. Id. at 13 (citing Sentencia No. C-098/96 (Corte Constitucional 1996)).
95. Id. at 14-15 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass'n Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1113 (H.L. 1999)).
96. Id. at 15 (Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, [2002] S.C.R. 86).
97. Id. (citing El-Al Israel Airlines v. Danilowitz, 48(5) P.D. 749 (S. Ct. 1994)).
98. Id. at 23 (citing Sentencia No. 11 1-97-TC, Registro Oficial, Supp. No. 203 (1997)).
99. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 25.
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 9-13.
105. Id. at 14-15.
106. Id. at 15-18.
107. Id. at 9.
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while relational privacy connects homosexual sexual partnerships with other familial
connections including family, marriage, and procreation '°8 and zonal privacy protects
activities that occur within a home.' °9 This internationalized multi-dimensional analysis
seemed to influence Justice Kennedy's analysis in Lawrence.
While discussing international and transnational law sources, Justice Kennedy
conceived of comparative law sources as protecting intimate, consensual conduct
that is an integral part of human freedom." ° Intimacy and freedom seemed
interconnected. Though Justice Kennedy recognized the Texas homosexual anti-
sodomy statute as touching on private conduct in the most private place, the
home,"' he rejected a spatial analysis when he wrote, "[f]reedom extends beyond
spatial bounds... [t]he instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions."" 2 Kennedy appeared to be discussing
relational privacy when he referred to intimate consensual conduct that constitutes
an integral part of freedom, as he noted that the Texas statute sought to control
personal relationships and that liberty, or freedom, counseled "against attempts by
the State ... to define the meaning of the relationship...
B. Justice Scalia's Critique
Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent,'1 4 responded negatively not only to
Justice Kennedy's use of substantive due process privacy law to protect
constitutionally homosexual sodomy,"5 but more pointedly Justice Scalia objected
strongly to Justice Kennedy's utilization of foreign law as a basis for fundamental
rights under American constitutional law."6 Justice Scalia found that American
constitutional entitlements fail to spring into existence because foreign nations
decriminalize certain types of behavior. To support his stand against allowing
foreign law to inform American constitutional law, Scalia utilized a concurring
opinion written by Justice Thomas in Foster v. Florida.'. where Thomas asserted
"this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans.""' Justice Thomas wrote his condemnation of
foreign law as an imposition on the American people in response to Justice
Breyer's dissent in Foster."9 Foster involved a denial of a petition for writ of
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id. at 15.
110. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
111. Id. at 567.
112. Id. at 562.
113. Id. at 567.
114. Id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 593-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (cert. denied).
118. Id. at 990, n* (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 991-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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certiorari from the Supreme Court of Florida.'20 The constitutional issue involved a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment by a death row inmate because more than
twenty-seven years had elapsed since the initial sentence of death.
l2 '
Justice Breyer asserted that the extraordinary length of confinement under a
sentence of death resulted at least in part from the State of Florida's repeated
procedural errors,' 2 and that "27 years awaiting execution is unusual by any
standard. ,23 Justice Breyer supported his assertion about the unusual nature of
delayed execution by referring to foreign law, specifically British,' 24 European
Human Rights, 25 and Canadian cases.2 1 Justice Thomas responded to Justice
Breyer's reference to foreign law by indicating that the American judiciary fails to
possess the competency to apply foreign law, while Congress, on the other hand,
could consider foreign law in its law making efforts. 2 7 Justice Scalia in his
Lawrence dissent went even further than Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion
in Foster. Justice Thomas had characterized foreign law as faddish, while Justice
Scalia in Lawrence characterized its use by Justice Kennedy in his majority
opinion as meaningless and dangerous dicta."'
V. NOT So DANGEROUS FOREIGN LAW
Lawrence evidenced a rift between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia
concerning whether foreign law served as a valid source for American
constitutional law. Justice Kennedy respected and utilized foreign law, while
Justice Scalia, found foreign law to be meaningless and dangerous. Justice Scalia,
in his criticisms of the Lawrence majority's use of foreign law, implied that Justice
Kennedy's use of foreign law to overcome long standing homophobic legal
tradition represented a revolutionary step in American jurisprudence, especially
constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Scalia implied that Justice Kennedy was doing
something out of the ordinary and very new. Justice Scalia also implied that Justice
Kennedy was wrong in utilizing international and transnational law 29 because such
law possessed no relevance to American law and challenged American
constitutional and jurisprudential sovereignty.
Justice Scalia's assertions about the irrelevance of foreign law to American
law, especially constitutional law, lack a basis in United States Supreme Court
decision making. The Supreme Court has long relied on foreign law to decide
120. Id. at 990.
121. Id. at 991-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 992 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Pratt v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1993).
125. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 439 (1989).
126. United States v. Burns, [200111 S.C.R. 238.
127. Foster, 537 U.S. at 990, n*.
128. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 573.
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constitutional and individual rights issues. The amicus brief, which Justice
Kennedy relied on to support his contention that many other nations protected the
rights of homosexuals, 30 cited a large number of Supreme Court cases that made
references to foreign law. The amicus brief argued that the United States Supreme
Court traditionally utilized international and foreign law to aid in constitutional
interpretation.13 ' The brief cited to remarks made by current Justices suggesting that
foreign law should serve as a legitimate source of authority for American courts. 
2
The brief also cited to a large number of majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions that referred to foreign law. 33 Most striking, the amicus brief provided as
an example of Supreme Court reliance on foreign law a dissent by Justice Scalia in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission134 in which Justice Scalia cited to
Australian, Canadian, and English statutory law.
35
What is especially surprising about Justice Scalia's assertions in Lawrence
about the meaningless and dangerous nature of foreign law as an analytical tool in
developing American constitutional and human rights law is that Justice Scalia
overlooked basic American civil procedure law. Pennoyer v. Neff 36 and Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co. 17 both include important foreign and international law components.
In Pennoyer, both the plaintiff sought to enforce a default judgment obtained
against the defendant who had been served only by constructive notice. 38 Utilizing
the Due Process Clause,'39 the Pennoyer Court held that a state court could not
obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident for the purpose of rendering a personal
judgment against the non-resident.
Justice Field wrote the majority opinion in Pennoyer.1' He developed a
conceptual model of state power to serve as the foundation for the substantive due
process doctrine of personal jurisdiction. The substantive nature of due process
grew out of the basic due process need for "a tribunal competent by its
constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of
130. Id. at 576-77.
131. See Amicus Brief, supra note 86, at 3-8.
132. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 348 (2002); William H.
Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM (1993).
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the suit .... 14' According to Justice Field, due process involved the existence of
legitimate power. If no such power existed, any putative use of non-existent power
constituted a violation of due process. Justice Field found that the power of the
American state governments, including their courts, were restricted when he wrote,
"[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of
the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those
limits would be deemed... an illegitimate assumption of power."'
43
Justice Field restricted state power to territorial limits. His bases for this model
were what he characterized as public law principles. Field analogized American
states to independent states, though he noted that American states were not in every
respect independent states because the United States Constitution limited their
powers. However, Justice Field still applied basic principles of public law to
American states. First, sovereign states possessed exclusive power over people and
property within the territory of the state. Second, no state possessed the authority to
exercise power over persons and property outside its territorial limits.'"4 Justice
Field applied basic principles of international law to develop the conceptual model
underlying substantive due process personal jurisdiction principles. In fact, Field
utilized an international law treatise written by Henry Wheaton.'
45
In addition to the international law treatise, Justice Field also relied on D'Arcy
v. Ketchum146 for conceptual support.'4 7 Field noted that courts failed to accord
credit to a judgment rendered where the defendant had not been served personally
and had a day in court. The D'Arcy Court looked to foreign law as support for the
proposition that national comity never existed in such a circumstance, because such
a proceeding with the defendant not provided service of process was considered an
illegitimate assumption of power. Justice Field in Pennoyer, referring to D'Arcy,
noted that, "'[t]he international law ... as it existed among the States in 1790, was
that a judgment rendered in one State ... was void within the foreign State, when
the defendant had not been served with process...
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Lawrence, disregarded Pennoyer and Justice
Field's use of international law as a basis for personal jurisdiction doctrine. What
Justice Scalia forgot was not only basic civil procedure doctrine but, more
importantly, basic substantive due process doctrine. Justice Scalia analyzed
substantive due process doctrine when he sought to limit substantive due process
rights to fundamental liberty interests. What Justice Scalia forgot was that the
142. Id. at 733.
143. Id. at 720.
144. Id. at 722.
145. Id. at 722 (citing 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPS, WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 131-32
(5th ed. 1919)).
146. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
147. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
148. Id. at 730.
149. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-94 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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early basis for substantive due process was international law. Justice Scalia wrote
approvingly about the Bowers majority opinion."O Justice Scalia forgot that the
Bowers Court referred to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,5,
and that Pennoyer was decided in 1877,152 less than a decade after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This early Fourteenth Amendment case law based
early substantive due process doctrine on international and foreign law. Justice
Scalia's disdain for foreign law as a basis for due process rights seems misplaced.
Foreign and international law not only influenced Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process law but more directly served as the conceptual early bases
for that doctrine.
Justice Scalia also forgot another fundamental civil procedure case that
implicated basic human rights. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,"' an injured party
brought a diversity action for bodily injuries. The defendant moved for an order
requiring the injured party to submit to a physical examination by physicians
appointed by the court, and the injured party refused to undergo a physical
examination.5 4 The district court judge held the injured party in contempt."'
Consequently, the injured party argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requirement that she submit to a physical examination" violated the terms of the
Rules Enabling Act which provided that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify litigants' substantive rights.'5 7 The injured party
argued that she possessed a substantive right to refuse to be examined by a physician
not of her choosing. In her argument, she translated the word substantive into
substantial, and therefore, argued that her right to refuse a physical examination
constituted a substantial right protected by the Rules Enabling Act.' 8 The injured
party presented the Supreme Court with the question of whether the rule's
requirement mandating physical exams undermined a substantial right protected by
the Rules Enabling Act.
In Sibbach, the Supreme Court found that the choice of taking or not taking
physical exams failed to constitute a substantial right. The majority questioned the
criteria for determining what constituted a substantial right.'59 Much like the
Bowers Court did in determining whether homosexual sexuality implicated a
fundamental liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,' 6° the
Sibbach majority looked to legal practice in the states and foreign countries to
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determine what served as a substantial right. The Sibbach Court noted that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requiring physical exams accords "with the
procedure now in force in Canada and England.""' The Sibbach Court cited to
foreign law for support. '
Justice Scalia, in his criticisms of Justice Kennedy's reliance on foreign law to
justify a due process privacy right protecting homosexual sexuality, overlooked the
influence of Foreign law on federal civil procedure rule interpretation. In his
dissent in Sibbach, Justice Frankfurter implied that physical exams implicated the
inviolability of the person, interference with the person of a free citizen, and
prejudices as to privacy."' He wrote, "[t]hat disobedience of an order under Rule
35 cannot be visited with punishment as for contempt does not mitigate its
intrusion into an historic immunity of the privacy of the person. ' '64 Sibbach
involved a basic human right, the choice of submitting to a medical examination.
Justice Scalia forgot the English and Canadian legal contributions in Sibbach that
contributed to the reformulation of this traditional privacy right by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent, accused Justice Kennedy and the
Lawrence majority of taking sides in what he characterized as the culture war. He
also accused the Lawrence majority of departing from the Supreme Court's
traditional role of neutral observer protecting democracy.16 In addition, he accused
his colleagues on the Supreme Court of furthering a homosexual agenda being
championed by the American legal profession.' 66 Justice Scalia, in his protestations,
implied that he was serving in Lawrence as the neutral proponent of traditional
American constitutional jurisprudence. His implicit characterization of himself
runs afoul of his own selective perception of American constitutional history. His
characterization of the Lawrence majority's use of foreign law as meaningless and
dangerous imposing foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans,'67 flew in the
face of longstanding Supreme Court practice.
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The very foundation of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process relied
on international and foreign law.1 68 Even the federal procedural aspects of privacy
law included foreign law influences.'6 Justice Kennedy in his use of foreign and
international law17 0 stood on firm ground. Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent,
warned that the United States Supreme Court risked judicially imposing
homosexual marriage on the United States.'7 1 Justice Scalia once again referred to
dreaded and dangerous foreign law as support for his warning. Specifically, he
pointed to Canadian case law.'17 Hopefully, the United States Supreme Court will
continue to heed foreign precedent and will take such Canadian case law seriously
if the constitutionality of prohibiting homosexual marriage is ever considered by
the Supreme Court. Hopefully, Justice Kennedy and a majority of the Supreme
Court will consider homosexual marital rights as "accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in... other countries."'73
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